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Articles
Due Process and the Subpoena Power in
Federal Environmental, Health, and
Safety Whistleblower Proceedings
By

The parties recognize and recite that ..

STEPHEN E.

SMITH*

the Court has stated its under-

standing that the Secretary of Labor has disavowed the existence of subpoena power under Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42
U.S.C. § 5851. Each party has acted in good faith to persuade non-parties
(or lawful representative on their behalf) to appear voluntarily for depositions and at trial, but witnesses with relevant knowledge have declined to
appear voluntarily. In view of the unwillingness of these witnesses to
appear voluntarily and the lack of subpoena power to compel their attendance at depositions or trial, complainant hereby withdraws his complaint
and asks that this proceeding be dismissed with prejudice .... I

So

ENDED THE nuclear whistleblower case brought by Douglas Harrison. In any other discrimination proceeding, in any other forum, his case
would go forward, evidence would be gathered, witnesses would be heard,
and a decision would be rendered. However, because Mr. Harrison alleged
his employer discriminated against him on the basis of health and safety
whistleblowing activity, instead of race, gender, or financial whistleblowing, his case was over before it started.
The employee protection provisions of various federal environmental,
health, and safety acts 2-the statutory basis for whistleblower claims-are
* Attorney Advisor, United States Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law
Judges; J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1996; B.A., Northeastern
University, 1993. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Labor or the Office of Administrative Law
Judges.
1. Harrison v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 96-ERA-19 (ALJ Aug. 7, 1996) <http:II
www.oalj.dol.gov>. Each of the whistleblower cases cited in this article can be found at this
website.
2. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1994); Federal Water Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (1994); En-
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heard by the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Administrative Law
Judges ("OALJ"). These claims might include those brought, for example,
by truckers against a private shipping company that requires drivers to carry
overweight loads; scientists employed by a state air quality management
board that tells the scientists to ignore violations; or nuclear technicians
who, for safety reasons, object to power plant procedures. Whistleblower
3
suits may be brought against public or private entities.
Whistleblower claims constitute only a portion of the OALJ bailiwick.
The OALJ conducts hearings under some fifty federal laws. 4 Under many
of these laws, such as the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
6
Act,5 Congress has specifically granted the subpoena power to the OALJ.
However, the subpoena power is conspicuously absent in various health and
7
safety whistleblower acts.
This Article argues that the subpoena power is a due process right
vested in whistleblower litigants and, therefore, congressional grants are unnecessary. First, this Article outlines the default rule against ALJ subpoena
power in whistleblower proceedings and of the precedents regarding ALJ's
subpoena power. This Article then analyzes the subpoena power in whistleblower cases, emphasizing courts' considerations in finding a procedure
mandated by due process, and concludes that subpoenas are a due process
right of whistleblower litigants. The due process analysis is organized in the
order typically employed by the U.S. Supreme Court. First, a property interest is identified, and the competing interests are explained and weighed.
Next, the risks of erroneous deprivation and the value of the subpoena
power is explored. This is followed by a review of the few available cases
on due process and subpoenas. Finally, this Article presents a brief history
of the subpoena power and its applicability to administrative proceedings.
ergy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6971 (1994); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1994);

Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (1994). This Article, when
using the term "whistleblower," refers to those individuals protected under these acts. There are,
of course, different types of whistleblowers subject to other statutory protections, who may bring

their cases in other fora.
3.

For example, under the Clean Air Act, "persons" may violate the whistleblower provi-

sion. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7602(e), 7622 (1994). A "person" may be "an individual, corporation,
partnership, association, State, municipality, political subdivision of a State, and any agency, department, or instrumentality of the United States." Id.
4. For a chart of currently active cases and the laws under which they are heard, see Guide

to Case Types (visited Mar. 29, 1998) <http://www.oalj.dol.gov/types.htm>.
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994).
6. See id. § 927(a).
7.

See discussion infra Part I.
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A Typical Example of a Whistleblower Statute

The employee protection provision of the Clean Air Act ("CAA") is
typical of a whistleblower statute. 8 This provision provides that "[n]o employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any
employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" 9 because that employee commenced a proceeding under
the Act,10 testified in such a proceeding,1 1 or "assisted or participated...
in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to carry out the
12
purposes of this chapter."
Whistleblower suits under the CAA are similar to Title VII 13 discrimination suits 14 in that a complainant under the CAA must make a primafacie
case. The complainant must show that: (1) he or she was discriminated
against with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment; (2) he or she had engaged in "protected activity"; and (3) the
employer had knowledge that the employee engaged in protected activity. 15
As a fourth element, the complainant must present sufficient evidence to
justify an inference that the respondent's (employer's) adverse action was
motivated by a retaliatory intent against the complainant. 16 However, cases
are rarely decided on the primafacie showing. Usually, a complainant must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the complainant's engaging in protected activity. 1 7 Once an administrative law judge ("AL") issues a
recommended decision in a whistleblower proceeding, any party may peti8.
9.
10.
11.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7622.
Id.
See id. § 7622(a)(1).
See id. § 7622(a)(2).

12. Id. § 7622(a)(3) (emphasis added). The end of this subsection provides broad protection,
eliminating the need for any formal proceeding to have commenced. See Kansas Gas & Elec. Co.

v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1512 (10th Cir. 1985). But see Water Pollution Prevention and Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1385 (1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994);
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). None of these acts contain similarly broad language.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000f (1994).
14. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
15. See.Carroll v. United States Dept. of Labor, 78 F.3d 352, 356 (8th Cir. 1996); see also
42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(A) (1994). This section holds that in cases arising under the Energy Reorganization Act, a primafaciecase must include a showing that protected activity was a "contributing factor" to the adverse action taken by the employer. See id. To overcome this showing, an
employer must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same
action in the absence of the complainant's protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(D)
(1994).
16. See Carroll,78 F.3d at 356.
17. See id.; see also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981) (holding that the plaintiff in a Title VII case always has "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated").
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tion for review by the Administrative Review Board ("ARB"). 18 An aggrieved party may appeal the ARB's decision to the appropriate court of
appeals. 19

II. The Default Against the Subpoena Power
The issue of subpoena availability only recently has come to the fore
in whistleblower proceedings. In Malpass v. General Electric Co.,20 the
Secretary of Labor put ALJs on notice that they did not have subpoena
power in most whistleblower matters. 21 Malpass was brought under the Energy Reorganization Act 22 ("ERA"). The Secretary noted that the Administrative Procedure Act permitted ALJs to "'issue subpoenas authorized by
law,"' 23 but that the ERA itself contained no such authorization. 24 The Secretary explained that he did not believe he could "assume powers not delegated to him by Congress simply by incorporating provisions, such as the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in departmental regulations. '25 Although
Malpass was decided under the ERA, that law is substantially similar to
other whistleblower statutes, none of which grant subpoena power. 26 Accordingly, subpoenas are now generally unavailable in whistleblower pro18. See Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Federal Employee
Protection Statutes, 63 Fed. Reg. 6614, 6624 (1998) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 24.8) [hereinafter Procedures]. This law applies to all whisteblower acts except the STAA. The STAA regulations are codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 19 (1997).
19. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7622(c) (1994) (allowing any person aggrieved by a Board's order
the right to have that order reviewed by the appropriate U.S. court of appeals).
20. 85-ERA-38 (Sec'y Mar. 1, 1994) <http://www.oalj.dol.gov>.
21. See id. at 11; see also Immanuel v. United States Dept. of Labor, No. 97-1987, 1998 WL
129932, at *5 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 1998).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5878a(a) (1994).
23. Malpass, 85-ERA-38, at 11 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2) (1994)). Of course, this may
contemplate a subpoena that is constitutionally required. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1994) ("Agency
subpenas authorized by law shall be issued to a party on request and, when required by rules of
procedure, on a statement or showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence
sought.").
24. See Malpass, 85-ERA-38, at 11.
25. Id.
26. See The Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(a)(1) (1994) (granting subpoena
power in limited circumstances not applicable in Department of Labor proceedings); see also
Immanuel, 1998 WL 129932. In an unpublished decision, the Fourth Circuit recently held that the
Water Pollution Control Act does not contain authorization for ALJ issuance of subpoenas. See id.
at *5. In Immanuel, the complainant sought subpoenas to compel the appearance of other employees of the respondent. See id. at *4. As noted by the court, a Department of Labor regulation, 29
C.F.R. § 18.29(a), provides that witnesses within a party's control may be compelled to appear
without a subpoena. See id. at *6. The court held that the ALJ erred by failing to compel the
witnesses to appear in accordance with the regulation. See id. at *6. Accordingly, the court did not
address the complainant's due process argument regarding subpoenas. See id. at *6 n.2.
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ceedings. 27 This came as a surprise to many ALJs who assumed they had
subpoena power pursuant to the regulations governing practice and procedure. 2 8 The subpoena rule clearly states that subpoenas "authorized by statute or law" may be issued 29-a fundamental element that was perhaps
overlooked or presumed. Administrative Law Judges were also puzzled because the OALJ frequently used the subpoena power when adjudicating
30
claims under other acts.
In the United States, the subpoena power is viewed as a judicial power
granted to the judiciary in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 31 Therefore,
courts initially disapproved Congress's granting the subpoena power to the
agencies. In In re Pacific Railway Commission,32 the court held that the
commission could not compel testimony because it was created by Congress and not a judicial body. 33 This remained the position of the courts for
27. ALJs have, nonetheless, issued subpoenas on due process grounds-the same basis for
subpoena power that this Article asserts. See Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 87-ERA-23, at 3-4
(ALJ Apr. 17, 1990) <http://www.oalj.dol.gov> (stating that because section 210 of the ERA
implicitly grants subpoena power to the Secretary to afford a constitutionally adequate hearing, it
follows that section 556 of the APA grants the same power to AUs); Young v. Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 87-ERA-36, at 2-4 (AU Sept. 15, 1987) <http://www.oalj.dol.gov> (basing subpoena power
on legislative history indicating that DOL proceedings were meant to operate in the same fashion
as the National Labor Management Act and the Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act, both of
which provide subpoena power).
28. See 29 C.F.R. § 18.24 (1997). The leading treatise on whistleblower litigation proceedings at the Department of Labor also assumes that this regulation itself gives ALJs subpoena
power. See STEPHEN M. KoHN*,THE WHISTLEBLOWER LITIGATION HANDBOOK: ENVIRONMENTAL,
HEALTH AND SAF'rY CLAIMS 16 (1990) ("All discovery requests should be accompanied by an

official Department of Labor subpoena .... When requesting subpoenas, state the name of the
case and the number of subpoenas needed." (citing 29 C.F.R. § 18.24)).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 18.24.
30. See 33 U.S.C. § 927(a) (1994).
31. See Universal Airline v. Eastern Air Lines, 188 F.2d 993, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (stating
the subpoena power "is a necessary and essential part of the 'judicial Power' vested by the Constitution in 'one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish"' (quoting U.S. CONST. art III, § 1)); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2195, at 78-88 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Wigmore stated:
Inherently and primarily, the power [to compel testimony] belongs to the judiciary, because the application of the law to facts in litigation requires a finding of the facts, and
the finding cannot be made without investigation, and the necessity of investigation
imports the power to compel answers and make disclosures of every sort.... The power
of the judiciary is frequently described in a statute or court rule, but no question of
inherent power can ordinarily arise.
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
32. 32 F. 241 (N.D. Cal. 1887).
33. The court wrote:
[The] production of the private books and papers of a party otherwise than in the course
of judicial proceedings, or a direct suit for that purpose ... [i]s the forcible intrusion

into, and compulsory exposure of, one's private affairs and papers, without judicial pro-
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seven years, 34 until the Supreme Court decided ICC v. Brimson3 5 in 1894.

In Brimson, the Court determined that because the Constitution granted
Congress power over interstate commerce, and since Congress had the
power to create an agency to further this charge, it could grant necessary
adjunct powers to enforce the laws it passed. 36 With Brimson, the subpoena
power ceased to be a strictly judicial power even though enforcement has
remained a judicial prerogative. It is now widely accepted that administrative agencies have the power to issue subpoenas only to the extent that
power is granted by Congress. Also, the courts will enforce agency subpoenas only when a court finds "that the investigation is authorized by Con'37
gress, and is for a purpose Congress can order."
Since Brimson, Congress has liberally granted the subpoena power to
the agencies it has created. 38 This generosity has not been total; subpoenas
have been omitted from some statutory schemes. A glaring example is the
absence of the subpoena power in the federal environmental, health, and
safety whistleblower proceedings.
III.

Procedural Due Process and the Subpoena Power

Congress has never been required to provide all the accouterments of a
"strictly judicial" proceeding in administrative hearings. 39 However, a legislative scheme with insufficient procedural protections may violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 40 This section of the Article apcess, or in the course of judicial proceedings, which is contrary to the principles of a free
government, and is abhorrent to the instincts of Englishmen and Americans.
Id. at 251.
34.

See, e.g., In re McLean, 37 F. 648 (E.D.N.Y. 1888).

35. 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
36. See id. at 470-74.
An adjudication that [C]ongress could not establish an administrative body with authority to investigate the subject of interstate commerce and with power to call witnesses

before it, and to require the production of books, documents, and papers relating to that
subject, would go far towards defeating the object for which the people of the United

States placed commerce among the States under national control.
Id. at 474.
37. Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
38. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 79r(c) (1994) (granting subpoena power to the Securities and Exchange Commission); 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1994) (granting subpoena power to the National Labor
Relations Board); 49 U.S.C. § 1113(a) (1994) (granting subpoena power to the National Transpor-

tation Safety Board).
39.

See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) ("Many requirements essential in

strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with in [sic] proceedings of this nature.").
40. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855)
(defining due process as "a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial
powers of the government," and prohibiting Congress from making "any process 'due process of
law,' by its mere will").
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plies the Supreme Court's procedural due process test to whistleblower litigation and concludes that these proceedings must include the subpoena
power in order to comport with the Due Process Clause.
The Supreme Court's relevant procedural due process jurisprudence
boils down to two principles. First, if a party possesses a legally recognizable liberty or property interest, he or she is entitled to certain procedural
protections. Second, the procedures to which the party is entitled depend
upon the circumstances of the governmental action being taken. 41 The general term, "circumstances," employed in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Local 473 v. McElroy42 has been subject to exigesis by the Court in its
seminal procedural due process case, Mathews v. Eldridge,4 3 and its progeny, Connecticut v. Doehr.44
A.

The Existence of a Property Interest

Before a court can consider whether any procedures are mandated by
due process, it must first determine if the party seeking the procedural protections has a property interest deserving of additional safeguards. 4 5 The
property interests protected by the Due Process Clause are "created and
their dimensions defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."'4 6 Of course, federal law may also provide the property interest, as
47
evidenced in welfare cases.
The property interest created by the whistleblower statutes is unlike
those presented in most procedural due process cases. The typical example
of a property interest is a government job, a cash entitlement, or an in-kind
entitlement. 4 8 These interests involve the transfer of value from the government to the individual. However, the property interest does not need to be a
41.

See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)

("[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved

as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.").
42.
43.
44.

Id.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
501 U.S. 1 (1991).

45.

See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).

46. Id. at 577.
47. See Mathews, 424 U.S. 319; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

48.

See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (finding state

employment to be a property interest); Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 (finding Social Security disability
benefits to be a property interest); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (finding employment
at state university to be a property interest); Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (finding Aid to Families with
Dependent Children ("AFDC") benefits to be a property interest).
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transfer of value; an employee's property interest can be the cause of action
itself.
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,4 9 the Supreme Court recognized
that "a cause of action is a species of property. 5 0° In Logan, the petitioner
filed a grievance with an Illinois administrative agency, alleging disability
discrimination by his employer.5 1 Under Illinois law, the agency was required to hold a hearing within 120 days, but the hearing was scheduled
five days too late.5 2 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the agency could
not exercise jurisdiction over the claim because the agency's action was
untimely.5 3 The agency could not, therefore, hear the petitioner's case. 54
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the "state-created right to redress
discrimination" 55 was a property interest and that the limitations period on
agency action deprived the petitioner of that property interest without due
56
process.
The difficulty in whistleblower proceedings is that unlike the petitioner
in Logan, a whistleblower is not denied access to the cause of action itself.
Therefore, if the cause of action is the property interest, there may be no
deprivation in a whistleblower case because the suit may proceed without
the subpoena power. In Arnett v. Kennedy57 a plurality wrote "where the
grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations
on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a
litigant ...must take the bitter with the sweet. ' '58 This seems particularly
true in a case where a cause of action is the property interest at issue. In
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,59 however, the Court disclaimed the "bitter with the sweet" approach, stating that "[t]he categories
of substance and procedure are distinct. ' 60 The Court abstracted from the
statutory scheme the property interest contained within it. In the context of
49.

455 U.S. 422 (1982). Logan was not a whistleblower claim case.

50.
51.

Id. at 428.
See id. at 426.

52.
53.
54.

See id.
See id. at 427.
See id.

55. Id. at 431.
56, See id. at 432.
57.

416 U.S. 134 (1974).

58. Id. at 153-54.
59. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
60. Id. at 541. One way out of this difficult problem is suggested by Professor Van Alstyne.
He suggests we "treatfreedom from arbitraryadjudicativeprocedures as a substantive element of
one's liberty," and notes that the idea "of liberty ... may easily accommodate a view that government may not adjudicate the claims of individuals by unreliable means." William Van Alstyne,
Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 487 (1977). This approach would relieve courts from the problem of determin-
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the whistleblower cause of action, the abstracted property interest is the
goal of the cause of action-freedom from discrimination.
In Loudermill, the Court did not consider the state job to be the property interest at issue. Rather, the property interest was the right not to be
discharged except for cause. 6 1 Similarly, the whistleblower's property interest is not his or her job, it is the right not to be discharged or discriminated
against for engaging in activities encouraged by the act-a right that may
be asserted against public or private entities. 62 The employer's converse
right is the right to discharge or discriminate for reasons unrelated to those
64
prohibited by the statute. 63 As required by Board of Regents v. Roth,
whistleblower statutes "secure certain benefits" to whistleblowers. 65 More
concretely, the employee's property right may be described as the newly
mediated employment contract between the parties.
In Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc.,66 a case brought under the em67
ployee protection provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act
("STAA"), the Court accepted the Secretary of Labor's statement that the
right to discharge an employee for cause, derived from the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the employees' union, 68 constituted a property interest that implicated due process protections." 9 This is
important to whistleblower proceedings, because in all of them, the employer possesses some right of discharge. The right will be either "for
cause" or "at will" and springs from either a contractual agreement or a
common law "fall-back." Hence, an employer seeking the right to a subpoena will have leapt the first due process hurdle. While the Brock Court
did not explicitly address the existence of a property right inhering in the
employee, it took seriously the employee's interest in continued employment and weighed it at the "private interests" stage of the Mathews
equation.

70

ing the scope of a property interest-that is, what is integral to the legislatively created interestand what exists separately in the constitutionally determined realm of procedure.
61. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39.
62. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a)-(f) (1994).
64.' 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
65. Id. at 577.
66. 481 U.S. 252 (1987).
67. 49 U.S.C. § 2305 (1982).
68. See Brock, 481 U.S. at 261 n.2.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 263.
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Interest Balancing

To determine if due process requires the subpoena power in
whistleblower proceedings, Mathews and Doehr require a balancing of:
[T]he private interest that will be affected by the official action; ... the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or
71
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Doehr involved a private party seeking a prejudgment remedy against
another private party and adjusted the third consideration of Mathews to
include the interest of the party seeking the remedy. 72 The analysis of due
process and the subpoena power requires similar considerations to those
enumerated in Mathews and Doehr, but should include yet another consideration-the interest of the subpoenaed party.
1. Interests of the Parties: Employer, Employee, and
Subpoenaed Party
The employer has a significant financial interest in a whistleblower
proceeding because of the potentially harsh consequences of an adverse
finding. An employer who has been found to have violated a whistleblower
statute: (1) must reinstate the complainant with back pay; (2) may be required to pay other compensatory damages including emotional distress and
reputation damages; and (3) on the complainant's request, must pay attorney's fees and costs. 73 Exemplary damages may be awarded in cases arising
under the Safe Drinking Water Act 74 and the Toxic Substances Control
Act.75 As well, exemplary damages may be awarded under some of the
Acts if the employer does not comply with an order and the Secretary
brings an enforcement proceeding in district court. 76 In addition to its financial interest, the employer also has a substantial interest in "controlling the
makeup of its work force. ' 77
On the other hand, the employee has an interest in maintaining his
source of income and ensuring his future employability. 7 8 The employee
also has a non-pecuniary interest in freedom from discrimination or retalia71.
72.
73.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7622(b)(2)(B) (1994).

74.

42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(h)(ii)(A)(IV) (1994).

75.
76.

15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(2)(B)(IV) (1994).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7622(d) (1994).

77.
78.

Brock, 481 U.S. at 263.
See id.
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tory actions in the work place. These interests are significant and weigh in
favor of substantial procedural safeguards.
The interest of the subpoenaed party, however, seems entitled to comparatively little weight. While being haled into court is inconvenient and
may lead to difficult business or personal relations with a party to the action, this possibility is a fact of modern life. Federal courts, state courts, and
many administrative agencies already possess the subpoena power, and an
individual may be compelled to testify in any of these fora. The possibility
of a third party being haled into court should whistleblower proceedings
provide the subpoena power is not a strong counterbalance to the interest of
the parties needing testimony and does not encroach significantly on the
79
rights of the third party.

2.

Governmental Interest

The government has two complementing and a third, competing, interest in these proceedings. First, as noted by the Court in Brock, the government has a substantial interest in "promoting . .. safety and protecting

employees from retaliatory discharge. ' 80 Second, in other whistleblower
acts, there are strong governmental interests in environmental protection
and public health. Granting the subpoena power furthers both of these interests. However, the third governmental interest is efficiency, which may be
compromised by a duty to enforce subpoenas.
In other words, if subpoenas are made available to whistleblower litigants, the government will have to expend time and resources to enforce the
subpoenas. Typically, even if a party has access to agency subpoenas, the
party cannot bring enforcement proceedings unless granted that power by
statute.8' Without enforcement power, the party must apply to the agency
82
issuing the subpoena to seek enforcement through an ex rel. proceeding.
In such a proceeding, an agency brings suit in district court to enforce an
agency order on behalf of the party. If the agency refuses the party's appli79. The foreseeability of being subpoenaed reduces any concern that subpoenas would too
greatly burden the pool of potentially subpoenaed parties. The Supreme Court explained this in the
analogous context of personal jurisdiction:

[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is .
that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly
administration of the laws," gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that

allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (citations omitted).
80.

Brock, 481 U.S. at 262.

81.
82.

See Wilmot v. Doyle, 403 F.2d 811, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1968).
See Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Little, 268 F. Supp. 755, 758 (S.D. Ind. 1966).
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cation, the party's only recourse is to petition to set aside the agency's final
order.

83

Whistleblower statutes generally permit the parties or the Secretary of
Labor to enforce the Secretary's dispositive orders. 84 Arguably, this procedure could also be followed to enforce other orders issued by the Secretary,
including subpoenas. In all likelihood, however, the need to resort to enforcement proceedings would be minimal:
3.

The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and the Value of Additional
Safeguards

The risk of erroneous deprivation of a litigant's property interest and
the value of additional safeguards is the major factor when considering the
subpoena as a due process requirement, and perhaps the most important due
process consideration generally. 85 The Supreme Court has stated "some opportunity for the employee to present his side of the case is recurringly of
obvious value in reaching an accurate decision. '86 A subpoena may provide
the only opportunity for a litigant to introduce certain types of evidence,
and, therefore, to "present his side of the case."
a.

Proof, Credibility, and Hearsay

In Goldberg v. Kelly, 87 the Supreme Court granted John Kelly a right
to a hearing prior to the termination of his welfare benefits. Although the
Court was careful not to spell out the precise outlines of the hearing to be
provided, it did spell out some of the procedures it thought necessary to
meet the demands of "rudimentary due process. '88 At its most general, the
Court described the right it granted as "'the opportunity to be heard."89
The Court further qualified this right by requiring the hearing to be both
"'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"90 Relevant to the
purpose of this Article, the Court assumed that part of this meaningful manner would be to give the party "an effective opportunity to defend by con83. See Wilmot, 403 F.2d at 815.
84. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(d)-(e) (1994) (permitting the Secretary or the
parties to seek enforcement of the Secretary's orders in whistleblower actions for violations of

emission standards).
85. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)
("[T]he quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to

serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error.").
86.
87.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).

88.

Id. at 267.

89.

Id. (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).

90.

Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
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fronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and
evidence orally." 9 1
The Goldberg Court acknowledged that the ability to confront adverse
witnesses is a basic due process requirement in certain situations; this appears to remain good law. 9 2 While it is true that Mathews denied a
pretermination hearing on disability benefits, foreclosing any opportunity to
confront witnesses, it acknowledged due process would require the opportunity in certain circumstances. 93 The Court characterized the evidence used
to deny benefits in a disability proceeding as "easily documented. ' 94 In Mathews, the relevant inquiry-the presence or absence of a medically determinable disability-could be satisfied by written medical reports. 95
Accordingly, a pre-termination hearing was not required. 96 The Court considered this different from a welfare determination, in which "a wide variety
of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility
and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking process. ' 97 The Court
noted that credibility determinations could come up in disability proceedings, but concluded that "procedural due process rules are shaped by the
risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality
'98
of cases, not the rare exceptions.
In general, whistleblower cases depend on the credibility of the evidence, as do most legal proceedings. As noted earlier, to make out his
prima facie case under a whistleblower statute, a complainant must show
that: (1) he was discriminated against with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment; (2) he had engaged in "protected
activity"; (3) the employer had knowledge that the employee engaged in
protected activity; and (4) an inference is raised that the discrimination was
motivated, at least in part, because the employee engaged in protected activity. 99 There are many instances in which the parties may prove these elements without a subpoena. In those cases, the necessary quantum of proof
will be within the control of the complainant and respondent. An ALJ may
compel the production of documents and the appearance of witnesses
91. Id. at 268.
92. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545.
93. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343-44.
94. See id. at 343.
95. See id. at 344-45.
96. See id. at 349.
97. Id. at 343-44; see also Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 553 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("When factual disputes are involved, therefore, an employee may deserve a
fair opportunity before discharge to produce contrary records or testimony, or even to confront an
accuser in front of the decisionmaker.").
98. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
99. See Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1989).
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within the control of the parties.1 °° The ability of the parties to make their
cases is aided, as well, by the application of the so-called "adverse inference
rule."l

01

The key question in any whistleblower proceeding is "what motivated
the employer in the actions it took against the employee?" Without engaging in a parade of horribles, the evidence necessary in many cases will not
be so easily available. To answer the "key" question, witnesses must testify.
Yet, without subpoenas, entire categories of witnesses and document custodians cannot be obligated to appear. These include: (1) former employees of
the alleged discriminator; (2) other employers of the putative
whistleblower; (3) environmental agencies contacted by the employee as
part of her "protected activity"; and, generally, (4) third-parties who are
aware of the events at issue but are not agents of either party.
Of course, the aggrieved employee will testify, and so, perhaps may an
officer of the company. However, because no one must testify, the employee may be placed at a disadvantage. The employer has something perhaps more powerful than a subpoena with which to coerce the testimony (or
silence) of its employees and contractors-the power of the purse.
The employer may also be disadvantaged. Impeachment witnesses
may be unavailable and the employee's testimony may contain significant
hearsay. In corroboration of his testimony, the employee can offer the affidavit of a friend or former co-worker. Since hearsay is admissible in most
whistleblower proceedings (except the STAA), the testimony and the affidavit may be considered for its substance. 102
100. See 29 C.F.R. § 18.29(a)(3) (1997); see also supra note 28.
101. See 29 C.F.R. § 18.6(d)(2) (1997). The "adverse inference rule" states:
If a party or an officer or agent of a party fails to comply with a subpoena or with an
order, including, but not limited to, an order for the taking of a deposition, the production of documents ....
or any other order of the administrative law judge, the administrative law judge, for the purpose of permitting resolution of the relevant issues and
disposition of the proceeding without unneccessary delay despite such failure, may take
such action in regard thereto as is just, including but not limited to the following: (i)
Infer that the admission, testimony, documents or other evidence would have been adverse to the noncomplying party ....
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even without a subpoena, an ALJ may require agents of the parties to
appear or not appear at the principal's peril. See UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1338 (D.C. Cir.
1972) ("If evidence within the party's control would in fact strengthen his case, he can be expected to introduce it even if it is not subpoenaed. Conversely, if such evidence is not introduced,
it may be inferred that the evidence is unfavorable to the party suppressing it.").
102. See Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 6614, 6623 (1998) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 24.6(e)(1)) (providing that "[flormal rules of evidence shall not apply, but rules or principles
designed to assure production of the most probative evidence available shall be applied"). But see
29 C.F.R. § 1978.100(b) (1997) (incorporating 29 C.F.R. § 18.802 (1997)).
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The admissibility of hearsay, without a corresponding ability to compel testimony, may be the strongest argument for a due process requirement
that the subpoena power be allowed in whistleblower proceedings. 03 The
Ninth Circuit, in Calhoun v. Bailar,1°4 noted that, in administrative proceedings not bound by hearsay rules, the admission of hearsay must, none10 5
theless, be guided by "indicia of reliability" and be "fundamentally fair."
The court listed a number of factors administrative bodies should consider
when making this determination, including "whether or not the declarant is
available to testify and, if so, whether or not the party objecting to the hearsay statements subpoenaes [sic] the declarant, or whether the declarant is
unavailable and no other evidence is available."10 6 In the absence of the
subpoena power, a regime of automatic unavailability is imposed and the
administrative body must admit and rely upon evidence that may not have
an important indication of reliability.
07
the Supreme Court recognized the imporIn Richardson v. Perales,1
tance of subpoenas in providing due process in administrative proceedings.
The Court upheld the use of medical reports in Social Security proceedings,
despite their hearsay nature.10 8 As the Mathews Court would five years
later, the Court accepted a certain inherent reliability in medical reports.109
Throughout its opinion, however, the Court noted that the claimant in the
matter never subpoenaed the declarants whose hearsay he found objectionable.1 10 This fact is part of the holding of the case, which states that evidence, "despite its hearsay character and an absence of crossexamination... may constitute substantial evidence.., when the claimant
has not exercised his right to subpoena the reporting physician and thereby
provide himself with the opportunity for cross-examination of the physician.""' The Court noted that the claimant was precluded from com103. It appears that the admissibility of hearsay in many administrative settings is not
designed to eliminate the right to confrontation, but to streamline the process. See I J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE iN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 4b, at 107-27 (Tiller rev. 1983). For instance, if hearsay
were not admissible in Social Security or Workers' Compensation proceedings, the doctors' reports-which make up the bulk of the relevant evidence-could be excluded. Should live testimony be required, subpoenas are typically available. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) (1994).
104. 626 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1980).
105. Id. at 148.
106. Id. at 149 (citations omitted).
107. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
108. See id. at 407.
109. See id. at 405 ("Courts have recognized the reliability and probative worth of written
medical reports ... and have admitted them as an exception to the hearsay rule.").
110. See id. at 397, 402, 404-05.
111. Id. at 402.
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plaining that he had been denied the right to confrontation since he had not
12
exercised his subpoena right.'
The import of Richardson is not that since the Social Security Administration has the subpoena power, so should the Department of Labor.
Rather, it is that the reliability of hearsay in administrative proceedings is
ensured by the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. It is also the
recognition that those fundamental procedural rights are made possible by
the subpoena power. Further, Richardson supports the principle that the allowance of hearsay in administrative proceedings is not intended to eliminate the need for reliability, but to reduce the stifling formalities that have
1 13
accreted in courtrooms over the centuries.
An alternative contention might be that employing the Due Process
Clause to eliminate the admissibility of hearsay would be a less intrusive
way of providing due process rather than permitting subpoenas. However,
to reach the "rudimentary due process" requirement of confronting witnesses, there is no reason a court should distinguish between a statutorily
provided procedure (allowance of hearsay) and the legislative failure to provide a procedure (subpoenas). The admissibility of hearsay is contained in
the Administrative Procedure Act, just as subpoenas are not, except "when
authorized by law." 114 The problem of erroneous deprivation seems more
logically solved by increasing, rather than decreasing, the amount of avail15
able evidence.'
Even in the absence of hearsay problems, subpoenas can be vital. As
noted above, entire witness classes may be unreachable without them. Testimony that may swing the outcome of a case can go unheard. Evidence
provided may be skeletal, reduced to a "he said, she said" level. This not
only compromises the "meaningful" nature of the hearing, it hampers the
pubic interest in arriving at an accurate result-one in which
whistleblowers are protected, but employers are not forced to bear the ex112. See id. at 405.
113. For a compelling explanation of why informal proceedings can sometimes provide a
more accurate and equitable result than a trial-type proceeding, see 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13 (2d ed. 1979). But see Muellner v. Mars, Inc., 714 F. Supp
351, 357 (N.D. I11.
1989) (quoting Department of Transp. v. Coe, 445 N.E.2d 506, 510 (Ill.
App.

Ct. 1983) ("'The truth is no less important to an administrative body acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity than it is to a court of law.'")).
114.
115.

5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2) (1994); see also discussion supra Part I.
Some may believe there is no inchoate due process right to subpoena because of the

many attendant procedures required by the subpoena power (e.g., a procedure to quash). But it is
not too difficult to fashion a set of constitutionally reasonable procedures to carry out the subpoena. In Goldberg, the Supreme Court granted the right to a hearing in benefit suspension proceedings-generally a right with a far greater number of attendant procedures than the right to
subpoena. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
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pense of compensating a non-whistleblower. It hardly seems "meaningful"
or "effective," given the nature of and stakes of whistleblower cases, to be
able to introduce into evidence only corroborating affidavits, without testimonial corroboration. Similarly, it does not seem "meaningful" or "effective" to have a decision entered against a complainant based on only the
other party's statements, without testimonial impeachment. A stark example
is provided in the Harrison case quoted at the beginning of this Article, in
which the complainant withdrew his claim because of his inability to obtain
testimony. 11 6 Presumably, he concluded that his case could not be effectively presented in the absence of subpoenaed non-party evidence.
b.

Finality

It must be remembered that the cases that address the issue of what
kind of hearing was due have all involved what were essentially preliminary
hearings, subject to later, de novo, review in either an administrative or
judicial forum. Brock, Loudermill, Mathews, Goldberg, and Doehr involved
initial determinations where there was opportunity for further development
of the record." 7 The interest involved was always an interim interest and
the risk of error was subject to later correction. In a whistleblower proceeding, the ALJ is the final creator of the record and may be the final factfinder. The ALJ issues a recommended decision 1 8 that may be reviewed by
the ARB on a party's petition, but is otherwise final." 9 The ARB reviews
the ALJ decision to determine if it is "supported by the evidence in the
record," "in accordance with law," and is otherwise "proper."' 20 Significantly, in STAA proceedings, the ARB decision must be "based on the
record and the decision and order of the administrative law judge."1 2 1 New
regulations for the other whistleblower acts no longer include this type of
language. 122 Even in the absence of this language, however, the ARB's task
is described as "review," 123 not to create a new record. The ARB does not
116.

See Harrison v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 96-ERA-19, at 2-3 (ALJ Aug. 7, 1996)

<http://www.oalj.dol.gov>; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
117. See Brock, 481 U.S. at 258; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 536; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323-27;
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 258.
118. See Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. 6614, 6623-24 (1998) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 24.7).

This law applies to all whisteblower acts except the STAA.
119. See Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. at 6624 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 24.7(d)). This law
also applies to all whisteblower acts except the STAA.
120. Jaenisch v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 81-ERA-5 (Sec'y June 25, 1981) <http://
www.oalj.dol.gov>, rev'd on other grounds, 697 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1982).

121.

29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c) (1997).

122.
123.

See 29 C.F.R. § 24.6(b) (1997).
See Procedures, 63 Fed. Reg. at 6624 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 24.8). 'Ibis law also

applies to all whisteblower acts except the STAA.
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conduct a hearing of any sort or consider any additional evidence. Once the
ARB issues its final decision and order, the parties may appeal to the appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals. 24 The court of appeals reviews the decision,
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, to determine if it is supported
by "substantial evidence," or if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 1 25 Substantial evidence
review is a relatively low standard of review. Substantial evidence is defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'' 26 The
court does not ask whether the Secretary of Labor made the decision the
court would have made were it to undertake de novo review, but rather,
whether its conclusion was reasonable. 127 In short, the ALJ decision may be
the Department's final decision, and, even if it is not, the record closes at
the ALJ level.
The Supreme Court addressed procedural due process in a
whistleblower context in Brock v. Roadway Express, 28 a case involving the
employee protection provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance
Act. In Brock, the employer questioned the constitutionality of a provision
of the STAA permitting preliminary reinstatement of employees who insti29
tuted whistleblower actions.'
Especially relevant is the plurality's discussion in Brock regarding
rights of confrontation and cross-examination and the partial dissents of
Justices Brennan and Stevens. The plurality 130 determined that such rights
were not necessary at the preliminary reinstatement stage of the
whistleblower proceeding.131 However, the plurality assumed that such protections were available at a later stage in the proceeding: "[f]inal assessments of the credibility of supporting witnesses are appropriately reserved
for the ALJ,before whom an opportunity for complete cross-examination of
opposing witnesses is provided."' 32 In their partial dissents, Justices Bren-

124. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7622(c) (1994).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994); see also Mackowiak v. University Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d
1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1989).
126. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
127. See Lockert v. United States Dept. of Labor, 867 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1989).
128.
129.

481 U.S. 252 (1987).
See id. at 257.

130. The plurality opinion was signed by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and
O'Connor. See id. at 253.
131.
132.

See id. at 266.
id.
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nan and Stevens felt that even at a preliminary stage, cross-examination and
133
confrontation should be permitted.
It should be noted that hearsay is not admissible in STAA
whistleblower proceedings.1 34 Accordingly, the plurality's assessment of
"complete cross-examination of opposing witnesses" is accurate under the
STAA. 135 If the statute at issue was one of the other whistleblower provisions however, the completeness of the cross-examination would be in
doubt since an "opposing witness" in these cases may be a hearsay declarant. Final assessments of issues, such as whether a protected activity took
place or whether a personnel action was retaliatory, may be made without
the "complete cross-examination" envisioned by the Court. Indeed, the emphasis on cross-examination by six justices seems to mandate the availability of subpoenas in these proceedings. Without the ability to subpoena an
important witness, cross-examination of that witness may be foreclosed.
The evidence upon which the final determination is made is developed
entirely in a forum that cannot provide subpoenas to the litigants before it.
The ALJ, the ARB, the court of appeals, and perhaps the Supreme Court, all
look at a record that may lack evidence that could be dispositive of the case.
Witnesses may remain unimpeached and events may remain uncorroborated
or unrecounted. Not only are the parties fighting with their hands tied behind their backs, the scorers must determine a winner based solely on
footwork.
The balancing called for by Mathews favors the provision of the subpoena power in whistleblower proceedings. The employer and employee
interests are strong, as is the government interest in public safety and environmental protection. On the other hand, the government's interest in efficiency and the subpoenaed parties' interests appear less important. The risk
of erroneous deprivation when evidence is unobtained and statements go
without cross-examination is great and is not subject to subsequent correction. To provide subpoenas would rectify this inordinate risk, making them
a valuable additional safeguard in these proceedings.
C.

Cases Addressing the Non-Statutory Right to Subpoena
Witnesses

There are other non-whistleblower federal, state, and local statutes that
provide some type of hearing system without the subpoena power.1 36 While
133. See id. at 269-70 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 276 (Stevens,
J., dissenting in part).
134. See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.100(b) (1997) (incorporating 29 C.F.R. § 18.802 (1997)).
135. Brock, 481 U.S. at 266.
136. See discussion supra Part I.
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no case has yet found the absence of the subpoena power under these statutes to constitute a due process violation, courts have infrequently addressed the issue. The great majority of the cases addressing the issue
acknowledge that there is no per se rule and that, even if no subpoena right
existed in the case at bar, the right to subpoenas may arise in the appropriate
case. Even Judge Friendly, whose purpose in Some Kind of Hearing137 appears to have been to keep the development of procedural due process
rights in check, acknowledged that any right to compulsory process should
be decided on a case-by-case basis and that "no general rule is
13
appropriate." s
For instance, in Prebble v. Brodrick,139 the plaintiff, a college professor, brought suit against a public university on the grounds that his due
process rights were violated in his dismissal proceedings. 140 One of his contentions was that due process was violated by his inability to subpoena witnesses. 141 The Tenth Circuit found no due process violation, but noted that
"[w]here such information from persons not produced at the hearing concerns an important issue in dispute, these objections might well be
valid."' 142 In Prebble, however, the plaintiff had admitted the relevant facts
pertaining to the key issue.143 The court further noted, in a footnote, "[w]e
do not, of course, decide that other procedural rights may not be of critical
importance in similar cases, e.g., cross-examination of a crucial witness." 144
Judge Posner has noted that the subpoena power possessed by Chicago
traffic hearing officers "provides an adequate safety valve for those cases, if
any (there may be none), in which fair consideration of the respondent's
defense would require, as a constitutional imperative, the recognition of a
right of confrontation." 145 This may be interpreted as approving the subpoena power as a means of ensuring the satisfaction of the due process right
46
of confrontation that sometimes exists. 1
137.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
Id. at 1282-83.
535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976).
See id. at 607.
See id. at 614 n.8.
Id. at 616.
See id.

144. Id. at 616 n.10.
145. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997).
146. Judge Posner asserted that the existence of any right to cross-examination "may not have
much life left after Mathews." Id. at 1352. There is nothing in Mathews, however, that amounts to
a blanket disapproval of the right to confrontation in an administrative context. The Court merely
weighed the interests at issue in the case before it and determined that, there, cross-examination
was not necessary. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349. While Judge Posner may believe that the Court
engaged in a more general weighing of the value of confrontation, the Mathews Court should be
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The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Batson,147 determined, without
significant discussion, that the lack of subpoena power was not a due process violation "[o]n this record." 148 The case involved a hearing before the
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service that regarded fraud and
overpayment of agricultural subsidies.149 The court quoted the district
court's finding that there was "no evidence in the record of any attempt by
the defendants to obtain the voluntary testimony of any witnesses." 150 The
result may have differed had the defendant attempted and failed to obtain
voluntary testimony.
In Basciano v. Herkimer,1 51 the Second Circuit found that an accidentdisability-retirement-benefits system that did not afford the subpoena power
satisfied due process requirements. 152 Like Mathews, however, this conclusion was based largely on the belief that medical determinations may be
made on a paper record: "[w]hile questions of credibility and veracity often
are best resolved in a trial-type hearing, we believe that evidence relevant to
a medical determination can be presented as effectively in writing as
53
orally."1
Cases decided before the 1970s boom of procedural due process cases
came to similar conclusions. In a case that assesses whether the discretionary nature of discovery depositions in NLRB proceedings denied an employer a "full and fair hearing,"1 54 the Ninth Circuit noted, inter alia, that
"no showing is made of denial of subpoena power to compel attendance of
witness or lack of opportunity to present rebuttal evidence."' 155 This appears
to imply that if subpoenas were denied, a full and fair hearing might have
been compromised. While noting that the NLRB has the subpoena
power, 156 and that the court's language may simply refer to the fact that
issuance of subpoenas by the Board is mandatory upon request, rather than
discretionary, the subpoena reference appears to be part of the court's determination of whether a "full and fair hearing" was provided. In other words,
the court appeared to weigh subpoena availability as a factor in determining
whether the hearing comported with due process.
taken at its word when it concluded that the balancing of interests is to be performed on a case-bycase basis.
147. 782 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1986).
148. Id. at 1315.

149. See id. at 1309-10.
150. Id.
151.
152.

605 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978).
See id. at 611.

153.

Id. at 610-11.

154.
155.
156.

Electromec Design & Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 635.
See 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1994).
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In Jordanv. American Eagle Fire Insurance Co.,157 the court inquired
whether a rate-setting procedure was a "quasi-judicial hearing." The court
noted "[i]f we were compelled to read into this statute a requirement for a
hearing... we would also have to read into it the powers and requirements
ancillary to such a hearing; including oaths, subpoenas, findings, conclusions, and a record of the proceeding." 158 The court also noted that it did
"not say that the necessary powers will not be implied where a quasi-judi159
cial hearing is clearly required."
In 1912, however, the Supreme Court, in Low Wah Suey v. Backus,160
found no requirement of compulsory process in an Immigration and Naturalization Service proceeding. 16' This is important because issues of credibility and veracity may be at issue in such cases. The case may have been
decided differently in the post-Goldberg era when the ability to confront
adverse witnesses was held to be a basic due process requirement.1 62 Moreover, the Court noted that the petitioner did not proffer the nature or charac163
ter of testimony that might have been received.
The preceding cases indicate that while courts are wary of finding that
due process requires the subpoena power, they nonetheless recognize the
possibility of such a requirement. The factors discussed by the courtsincluding the necessity of credibility determination, the importance of particular evidence, and the right of confrontation-are also factors in
whistleblower proceedings. Therefore, if the language of these cases is applied in a whistleblower context, the courts would likely require subpoenas
in these proceedings.
IV.

Historical Support

Due process jurisprudence, both substantive and procedural, has long
looked to the empirical past to find the normative present. 64 In Connecticut
157.

169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).

158.
159.

Id. at 287.

160.
161.
162.

225 U.S. 460 (1912).
See id. at 470-71.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

Id.

163. See Backus, 225 U.S. at 470.
164. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937). See the long line of personal jurisdiction cases, beginning with Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940), and continuing through Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480

U.S. 102 (1987). In jurisdiction cases, the Court regularly refers to "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463. Admittedly, the Court rarely has given historical substance to its nebulous incantation. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-14. Nonetheless, its references suggest that the guide to proper practice lies somewhere in the past.
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v. Doehr,165 the Court explicitly acknowledged the importance of comparing current practice to historical antecedents. 166 The Court found support
for its conclusion that a prejudgment attachment violated due process because the procedure was "unknown at common law." 167 The Court
"checked its math" against the calculations done by history.
The idea of examination of rights available at common law to determine the metes and bounds of due process was championed by Edward
Rubin in 1984.168 Rubin suggested that the content of "minimum procedures" could be derived from common law "archetypes."' 169 This is some1 70
thing the Court has done in the past, using the "civil trial archetype,"
most notably in Goldberg.17 ' The application of Mathews balancing, therefore, begins with a choice of the procedural protection to be balanced,
which is not conjured from the imagination, but adopted from past practice. 172 The Mathews framework does not eliminate the need for reference
to judicial forms of procedure, it merely creates a methodology for evaluating them in a particular setting.
In the context of determining due process rights, it is the history of the
litigants within the fora, not the history of the particular adjudicative fora
itself, that is important in establishing the outlines of due process. In other
words, what procedures were historically available to the litigants in proceedings (whether within an administrative agency or in a common law
court) to secure their rights? In this regard, the following discussion of Arti165. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
166. See id. at 16, 23.
167. Id. at 16. Similarly, in Fuentes, the Court addressed the propriety of a prejudgment
seizure under Florida and Pennsylvania laws. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80. The Court's primary
focus was a balancing of the hardships involved in prejudgment seizure, but the analysis also
included historical comparison. See id. In assessing the modem statutes at issue, the Court noted
that when prejudgment seizures were allowed at common law, available procedures provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. See id. at 80-81.
168. See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL.L. Rav. 1044
(1984).
169. Id. at 1179; see also Brock, 481 U.S. at 273 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (referring to
"the traditions of due process").
170. Rubin, supra note 168, at 1148.
171. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-71 (listing the required trial-type procedures).
172. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. United States Dept. of Energy, 680 F.2d 156, 179 n.44 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1982)). The court in Pennzoil quoted Plato, who stated:
[T]hey summon to their aid visible forms, and discourse about them, though their
thoughts are busy not with these forms, but with their originals, and though they discourse not with a view to the particular square and diameter which they draw, but with a
view to the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on. For while they employ
by way of images those figures and diagrams aforesaid, which again have their shadows
and images in water, they are really endeavouring to behold those abstractions which a
person can only see with the eye of thought.
Id. (quoting PLATO, Tm REPUBLIC 233 (J. Davies & D. Vaughan trans., 1895).
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cle I and III courts is really just a means of comparing the expectations of
litigants and assessing whether litigants' rights should change because of
the forum in which they find themselves.
Whistleblower suits are a type of employment discrimination litigation, with similar elements and remedies as other such suits. 173 Of course,
the history of employment discrimination litigants is a brief one, but it is a
history that has included access (at some point in the proceedings) to common law courts (with Article III judges) and the procedures available in
them. While Congress placed whistleblower suits within DOL jurisdiction
(with Article I or "administrative" judges), it did not alter the nature of the
underlying interests at issue. In comparing the nature of Article I courts to
the rest of Article I actors and Article III courts, it is clear that the appropriate comparison is to the courts. The attributes of Article I courts are largely
those of their Article III models. While Article I judges do not enjoy life
tenure, their agency can remove them only after good cause is established
before the Merit Systems Protection Board, after opportunity for a hearing. 174 Article I judges are prohibited from ex parte contacts.1 75 They must
act impartially. 76 Perhaps the most telling example of the difference between the administrative adjudicator and the rest of the agency structure is
that the adjudicator may "not be responsible to [or be supervised by] an
employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency."' 177 These provisions result in an independent
adjudicator who may rule against an agency determination. Wigmore
states:
Inherently and primarily, the power [to compel testimony] belongs to the
judiciary, because the application of the law to facts in litigation requires
a finding of the facts, and the finding cannot be made without investigation, and the necessity of investigation imports
178 the power to compel answers and make disclosures of every sort.
Administrative adjudicators, too, must apply law to facts in order to
determine the rights of litigants. The administrative adjudicator's actions
are not preliminary or advisory, but determinative of the litigation. Accordingly, while administrative adjudication is paid for by agency budgets, it
has more in common with Article III courts than other Article I agencies.
Thus, the history of the availability of subpoenas to common law
courts may assist in the evaluation of whether due process requires compul173.

See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.

174.
175.
176.
177.

See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1994).
See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (1994).
See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994).
5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (1994).

178.

8 WIGMORE,supra note 31, § 2195, at 78.
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sory process. The procedural due process cases make clear that the placement of a cause of action in an administrative setting does not necessarily
abrogate the protections that would be available in the common law courts.
While balancing is used to determine if the process is due, the process itself
is uniformly adopted from past practice. Administrative proceedings must
be able to deviate from established judicial practice to the extent that there
are supportable reasons for deviation. In Mathews, for instance, because of
the costs associated with providing an evidentiary hearing and because the
179
relevant evidence is documentary, different procedures were permissible.
The starting point is always traditional procedure, perhaps because it is the
raw material with which the courts are familiar.
A.

Subpoena History in English Common Law

The substantive due process inquiry has long been whether a right is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 180 Similarly, the procedural due
process cases that grant hearing rights do so, sub silentio, because it is
outside our conception of ordered liberty to take liberty or property without
such a hearing. This is why the Supreme Court grants hearing rights instead
181
of, say, a right to trial by ordeal.
In the thirteenth century, trial by jury replaced trials by battle and the
various forms, of ordeal. 182 The jurors included in these early panels were
selected from the community in which the incident that gave rise to the trial
occurred. 183 These jurors were expected either to have personal knowledge
of the incident, or to investigate themselves, to determine the pertinent
facts.1 84 At this early stage in the development of trials, witnesses were
185
unnecessary, or at least, unused.
A problem arose in this scheme of dispute resolution-no rules governed jury fact-gathering, and litigants insinuated themselves into the process, bringing pressure to bear on the jurors and their sources. 186 In
response, the courts developed the crime of maintenance, defined as "up179.

See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343-47.

180.
181.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
A trial by "ordeal" was one in which "the Almighty was appealed to through brutal

physical abuse and torture." Peter G. Keane, The Jury-Some Thoughts, Historicaland Personal,

47 HASTNGS L.J. 1249, 1249-50 (1996). These ordeals would include hot iron, boiling water, the
cursed morsel, or tossing a bound defendant into the river. See id. at 1250 & n.6.
182. See 1 WILLIAM. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 341 (7th ed. 1956).
183. See id.
184. See Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74 MNN. L.

REv. 37, 43 (1989).
185.
186.

See id. at 43.
See id.
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holding [a litigant] ... by word, action, writing, countenance, or deed." 187
In other words, it was illegal for a person to go to a jury with information or
to be a witness. The courts at this time apparently believed that any voluntary testimony was interested, biased testimony. The possibility of being
penalized for offering testimony understandably chilled the participation of
88
witnesses.
The reluctance of witnesses to testify created an obvious problem for
the determination of facts, which was resolved in the fourteenth century by
John of Waltham, the chancery clerk, who developed the subpoena ("under
penalty").1 89 With the passage of the Statute of Elizabeth in 1562, the common law courts were explicitly invested with the subpoena power.' 90 The
Statute of Elizabeth assessed a ten-pound penalty for failure to appear after
being subpoenaed.' 9 1 Since the witness so summoned was compelled to
192
appear, he would no longer face the possibility of a maintenance action.
Thereafter, witness testimony became increasingly common until it became the primary source of information for the jury. 193 English common
law followed colonists to the new world and was applied in American
courts after the Revolution. 194 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized
an inherent right of a common law court to issue subpoenas, stating: "'The
right to resort to means competent to compel the production of written, as
well as oral, testimony, seems essential to the very existence and constitu95
tion of a Court of Common Law.""
B.

Subpoena History in the Constitution

An argument may be made that the Fifth Amendment does not mandate the right to subpoena. Applying the principle of expressio unius est
3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 182, at 398 (3d ed. 1923).
See 9 HOLDSWORm, supra note 182, at 182 (1926).
189. See 8 WIOMORE, supra note 31, § 2190, at 65 n.19.
190. See 5 Eliz., ch. 9, § 12 (1562) (Eng.); see also 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 182, at 185; 8
WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 2190, at 65 n.17.
187.

188.

191.

See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 2190, at 65 n.17.

192. See id. § 2190, at 65.
193. See id.
194. See Patterson v. Winn, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 233 (1831), referring to, inter alia, 13 Eliz., ch. 6
(1570) (Eng.). Justice Story wrote "[tihese statutes being passed before the emigration of our
ancestors, and being applicable to our situation and in amendment of the law, constitute a part of
our common law." Id.
195. American Lithographic Co. v. Werckmeister, 221 U.S. 603, 609 (1911) (quoting Amey
v. Long, 103 Eng. Rep. 653, 658 (K.B. 1808); see also Universal Airline v. Eastern Air Lines, 188
F.2d 993, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (stating the subpoena power "is a necessary and essential part of
the 'judicial Power"'); In re Trombetta v. Van Amringe, 280 N.Y.S. 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935)
(finding that a magistrate, without statutory authority to issue a subpoena duces tecum in a preliminary hearing, nonetheless had an inherent power to do so).
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exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing demonstrating the intended exclusion of another), one can read the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a
compulsory process in criminal cases as demonstrating that subpoenas were
not envisioned in the due process guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. It is,
of course, a modem truism that the strictest procedural safeguards are, and
should be, found in criminal prosecutions. Therefore, it may be said, if subpoenas are guaranteed to criminal defendants, they must be part of the ex1 96
panded procedure to which they are typically entitled.
The history of compulsory process belies this interpretation. In fact,
laws such as the Sixth Amendment were intended simply "to cure the defect
of the common law by giving to parties defendant in criminal cases the
common right which was already in custom possessed... by parties in civil
cases." 197 Subpoenas, then, are not unique to the Sixth Amendment, nor are
they a privileged form of procedural safeguard. They should be seen for
what they are: a standard procedural device available generally to parties.
In Doehr,the Supreme Court noted that its own historical practice supported its analysis that due process protections were required. 198 Similarly,
historical practice supports the power of litigants to receive subpoenas in
whistle blower proceedings. If due process is sometimes defined as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 1 99 and if this concept is often conceived in a historical sense, i.e., asking whether the founding fathers
expected this to be provided, then access to subpoenas is certainly required
by due process.
At the time of the nation's founding, there was no distinction between
Article III and Article I courts. There were simply courts and they possessed the subpoena power. The Article I Department of Labor court provides essentially the same function as any other court; it permits the
resolution of particular disputes between private parties. By establishing a
state forum for the resolution of disputes between private parties with binding legal effect on those parties (i.e., an Article I court), Congress has created a body in the precise image of the courts known to the founding
fathers. Those courts had employed subpoenas for some 200 years and continue to do so today in the form of Article III courts. Historically, final fact196.

See, e.g., 2 DAVIS, supra note 113, § 10.6, at 327 ("In the full panoply of a criminal trial,

other [procedural rights] that might be added include a jury trial, a right to appeal to a higher
authority, [and] a right to subpena witnesses and evidence .... " (numbering omitted)). See also
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (holding compulsory process is "a fundamental
element of due process of law" in criminal cases).
197. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 2191, at 68; see also State v. Dehler, 102 N.W.2d 696, 704
(Minn. 1960).
198. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991).
199. Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319. 325 (1937).
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finders have had the subpoena power. Thus, in this regard, the history of
administrative courts is the history of common law courts.
While subpoena history has frequently been conceived as the history
of a court's power to issue subpoenas, it should also be conceived as the
history of a litigant's right to subpoenas. Indeed, even when compulsory
process was seen primarily as an issue of court power, trial procedures were
recognized as personal rights. 20 0 In the post-Goldberg era, it is apparent that
the procedures developed by courts over generations were not intended to
aggrandize or protect the courts themselves, but were instead tools developed to protect the parties pursuing claims within those courts.
Conclusion
The opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine in
whistleblower proceedings is seriously compromised by the absence of the
subpoena power. In other cases in which the Supreme Court has addressed
procedural inadequacies, the parties have had a later opportunity to develop
their cases. In whistleblower cases, the parties' only opportunity is before
the AL. In administrative proceedings in which hearsay is admissible, subpoenas are typically available as a safeguard against the potential unreliability of the hearsay. This is not so in whistleblower proceedings. Without
subpoenas, the risk of error is unacceptably high and the full and fair nature
of the hearing is questionable. Historically, in fora that determine the respective rights of private parties, the subpoena power is available to permit
accurate fact-finding. There is no reason that parties to whistleblower proceedings should get any less.

200. See Osgood v. Nelson, 5 L.R.-E. & I. App. 636, 646 (H.L. 1872) (holding that courts
must ensure that proceedings are "conducted in a proper manner," which includes accused persons
being able to call and cross examine witnesses).

